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Abstract—Community detection for Location-based Social Networks (LBSNs) has been received great attention mainly in the field of
large-scale Wireless Communication Networks. In this paper, we present a Differential Privacy Latent Trajectory cOmmunity Discovering
(DP-LTOD) scheme, which obfuscates original trajectory sequences into differential privacy-guaranteed trajectory sequences for trajectory
privacy-preserving, and discovers latent trajectory communities through clustering the uploaded trajectory sequences. Different with
traditional trajectory privacy-preserving methods, we first partition original trajectory sequence into different segments. Then, the suitable
locations and segments are selected to constitute obfuscated trajectory sequence. Specifically, we formulate the trajectory obfuscation
problem to select an optimal trajectory sequence which has the smallest difference with original trajectory sequence. In order to prevent
privacy leakage, we add Laplace noise and exponential noise to the outputs during the stages of location obfuscation matrix generation and
trajectory sequence function generation, respectively. Through formal privacy analysis, we prove that DP-LTOD scheme can guarantee
ε-differential private. Moreover, we develop a trajectory clustering algorithm to classify the trajectories into different kinds of clusters according
to semantic distance and geographical distance. Extensive experiments on two real-world datasets illustrate that our DP-LTOD scheme can
not only discover latent trajectory communities, but also protect user privacy from leaking.
Index Terms—Location-based Social Networks, Communication Detection, Trajectory Clustering, Privacy Preserving.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
R ECENTLY, Location-based Social Networks (LBSNs) (e.g.Foursquare, Facebook Place, Twitter or Geolife, etc.) emerged
due to the rapid development of online social networks and physical
localization technologies. The characteristic is that people can make
use of “check-in” to achieve the sharing and propagation of location-
based services in virtual world [1].
As shown in Fig.1, three relational graphs (i.e. 1© user-location,
2© user-user, 3© location-location) are generated for LBSNs. User-
location graph reflects the relation between user and location, in
which different locations are visited by different users. User-user
graph represents the relation between two users, such as friendship,
common interests or preference, etc. Location-location graph shows
the relation between two locations, which can explain the physical
distance or the similar semantical information among locations.
According to the analysis of graph theory, large numbers of poten-
tial social relationship among users may be mined [2]. Meanwhile,
trajectory data reflects the sequence of visited locations associated
with time. With the collection and storage of large numbers of
trajectory data, the users who have similar interest or preference
can be clustered into a community, in order to share the common
interested contents (e.g. travel routes, restaurants or entertainments,
etc.) with each other [3]. Also, trajectory community discovering
can offer help for many kinds of applications, such as personalized
service recommendation [1], [4], content distribution [5], [6], [7], [8]
• C. Xu, Y. Liu and J. Guan are with the State Key Laboratory of Networking and
Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (e-
mail: cqxu@bupt.edu.cn; liu.yang@bupt.edu.cn; jfguan@bupt.edu.cn).
• L. Zhu is with the School of Computer and Communication Engineering,
Zhengzhou University of Light Industry (e-mail: lzhu@zzuli.edu.cn).
• S. Yu is with the School of Software, University of Technology Sydney (e-mail:
shui.yu@uts.edu.au).

Fig. 1. The architecture of LBSNs.
and intelligent transportation systems [9], [10], and so on. However,
the problem of privacy leakage is inevitable when users publish
their real trajectory information to LBSNs server. Untrusted third
parties may take advantage of the publicly available data to commit
malicious activities [11]. For example, attackers can deduce the
personalized information (e.g. family address, working place, or
living habit) of victims by analyzing the Global Positioning System
(GPS) trajectories. If users find out that their privacy may be stolen
by the attackers, they will no longer contribute to the location-based
services. Therefore, privacy-preserving is important for LBSNs to
guarantee good performance.
The common goal of all privacy-preserving methods is that they
must protect the user privacy against information leakage, meanwhile
provide various of services with high precision. This is a challenging
task, particularly for the tradeoff between privacy-preserving and data
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utility [12]. Traditional privacy-preserving methods mainly include k-
anonymity [13], l-diversity [14] and t-closeness [15]. Take the familiar
k-anonymity for example, it requires each record in the published
datasets to be consisted of at least k different participants. As we
know, k-anonymity achieves the privacy-preserving by shielding or
obfuscating some fields of the databases. For linking attack, adver-
saries can not link any records to the specific participants. However,
it only provides limited privacy-preserving because of different level
of background knowledge. That is to say, k-anonymity can fail
to provide adequate privacy protection if the attacker has enough
background knowledge. In practice, attackers can still make use of
the additional data sources and theoretical analysis to deduce the
sensitive information in databases.
Based on traditional privacy-preserving methods, privacy-
preserving in LBSNs can be divided into location privacy-preserving
and trajectory privacy-preserving. For location privacy-preserving,
the aim is to protect user location information from leaking. Current
location privacy-preserving methods mainly utilize Trusted Third
Party (TTP) to obfuscate the actual location information. Although
the data utility is guaranteed, they depend on the assumption that
TTP is fully credible. Therefore, the location information could
still be stolen by attacking TTP. Corresponding to location privacy-
preserving, trajectory privacy-preserving is to prevent sensitive lo-
cation information from leaking when attackers acquire the whole
trajectory information of victims. However, the data utility is limited
for existing trajectory privacy-preserving methods.
In this paper, we focus on Differential Privacy Latent Trajectory
cOmmunity Discovering (DP-LTOD), which is a new framework that
not only protects user trajectory information from leaking, but also
provides effective services for users. Latent Trajectory cOmmunity
Discovering (LTOD) aims to cluster the users who have similar
interest or preference into a community. By analyzing the uploaded
trajectory data, the corresponding interest or preference of each user
can be mined. To make LTOD satisfy differential privacy, we firstly
transform true locations of users to the obfuscated locations. Then,
the obfuscated trajectory sequence of each user can be generated
by combining the locations according to time series and distance.
Finally, LBSNs server analyzes the obfuscated trajectory data of users
to achieve DP-LTOD.
The contributions of our work can be divided into three aspects
as following.
1) We formulate the trajectory obfuscation technique to select
an optimal trajectory which has the smallest difference with the
original trajectory. We prove this problem is a NP-hard, and propose
a heuristic trajectory obfuscation algorithm to solve the problem.
2) We present a trajectory clustering technique to classify the
trajectories into different kinds of clusters according to semantical
distance and geographical distance. Furthermore, a latent trajectory
community discovering method (LTOD) by leveraging our trajectory
clustering technique is proposed. It can discover the users who have
similar interest or preference and cluster them into a community.
3) We design a differential privacy latent trajectory community
discovering (DP-LTOD) scheme, which not only protects user privacy
from leaking, but also provides effective services for target users.
During the stage of location obfuscation matrix generation, noise
based on Laplace distribution is added to the numeric outputs.
Also, the noise based on exponential distribution is added to the
non-numeric outputs at the stage of trajectory sequence function
generation.
4) Through formal privacy analysis, we prove our DP-LTOD
scheme satisfies ε-differential privacy. We conduct an extensive
experimental study over two real datasets. The experimental results
demonstrate that our DP-LTOD scheme can privately discover latent
trajectory community with high accuracy.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review the related works on trajectory com-
munity discovering, location privacy preserving, trajectory privacy
preserving and differential privacy data publishing.
2.1 Trajectory Community Discovering
It involves the research on trajectory clustering according to uploaded
trajectory information, which is an important process to find the
users with similar movement pattern. Traditional trajectory clustering
methods were to take the whole trajectory as a unit to cluster. Gaffney
et al. [16] proposed a trajectory clustering-based mixed regression
model, which made use of expectation maximization (EM) algorithm
to calculate the membership degrees of objective. After that, Chudova
et al. [17] proposed a mixed model aimed at translation invariant
of curve clustering, which was used to study trajectory clustering
according to the space-time trajectory drifting of objective. However,
some information may be missed when clustering trajectories as a
whole. For example, the similarity of sub-trajectories can also reflect
the similarity of the whole trajectories. Han et al. [18] proposed
a new partition-and-group framework to discover common sub-
trajectories for clustering trajectories. Mining communities based on
trajectory-related information (e.g. spatial distance, time, or veloc-
ity, etc.) had been an effective method to find similar users. Lee
et al. [19] proposed a unifying framework (UT-patterns) to mine
trajectory patterns according to the strength of temporal constraints.
Zhu et al. [20] made use of sequential probability tree (SP-tree) to
discover movement-based communities of users. In [21], Zhao et
al. proposed a probabilistic generative model, which made use of
different lifestyle-related patterns mined from trajectory data to infer
the social strength of users. Although the aforementioned studies offer
important insights into this topic, none of them worked on mining
latent trajectory communities according to the interest or preference
of each user. Our work aims to fill in this gap by taking semantic
information and geographical information into account to cluster the
users who have similar interest or preference into a community.
2.2 Location Privacy Preserving
In LBSNs, users publish their location-related contents to server in
order to acquire personalized service. If the server is vulnerable,
attackers may steal user actual location information to do illegal
things. Location privacy preserving is important for users to protect
their privacy from leaking. Early researches mainly included three
aspects: (1) False location [22]. The basic idea was to transform the
actual location into one or more false locations and publish them to
server. (2) Spatial cloaking [23]. The techniques in this category
generalized the actual location into a cloaked spatial regions which
were guaranteed to satisfy the k-anonymity. (3) Encryption [24].
The main idea was to provide effective location privacy preserving
without the assistance of Trusted Third Party (TTP). Due to the
high cost of false location method in resource-constrained mobile
devices, Liu et al. [25] modeled the process of dummy generation
as Bayesian games and proposed a strategy selection algorithm to
help users achieve optimized payoffs. However, more redundant
results were still be returned from the LBSNs server because of
more noises in the query, which made a higher communication cost
in mobile client. Spatial cloaking techniques can well reduce the
load of mobile client depending on a TTP. Despite this, location-
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incremental clique-based cloaking algorithm by taking the location
k-anonymity and cloaking granularity as privacy metrics to defend
against location-dependent attacks. In this paper, we also utilize an
encryption technique without regard to the limitation of TTP. The
novelty of our research compared with previous studies is that server
generates differential privacy-guaranteed location obfuscation matrix,
and mobile terminal utilizes downloaded location obfuscation matrix
to transform the actual location into other locations, which have the
similar feature with original location.
2.3 Trajectory Privacy Preserving
Trajectory privacy preserving is to protect user trajectory information
from leaking. Once one trajectory information is stolen by attackers,
the sensitive location information is exposed. Even the attackers may
predict the next location of victims according to the revealed tra-
jectory information, which seriously threatens the personal safety of
users. Existing studies on trajectory privacy preserving are classified
into three categories: (1) Dummy trajectories [27]. The techniques
in this category generated the dummy trajectories according to
original trajectories and published them to server. (2) Trajectory
k-anonymity [28]. Similar with location k-anonymity, the actual
trajectory information could be concealed by TTP. (3) Inhibition
technique [29]. The main idea was to forbid the data release of
sensitive location information to protect the individual trajectory
privacy of users. Aimed to balance the data utility and k-anonymity
trajectory privacy, Han et al. [30] proposed a semantic space trans-
lation algorithm (SST) which provided different levels of privacy
protection for different locations. Hwang et al. [31] introduced a novel
time-obfuscated technique which breaks the sequence of the query
issuing time to protect users’ trajectory privacy. In this paper, we
utilize trajectory sequence function to generate obfuscated trajectory
sequence corresponding to original trajectory sequence. Compared
with previous studies, the novelty of our research is that we partition
the trajectory into different segments, and select the optimal segment
at each time slot according to differential privacy-guaranteed segment
selection technique.
Besides the above location privacy-preserving and trajectory
privacy-preserving, most existing literatures address trajectory ob-
fuscation based on differential privacy in mobile data publishing
have been studied recently. For quantifying the level of privacy-
preserving, V. Rastogi et al. [32] firstly proposed differentially pri-
vate aggregation algorithms (i.e. PASTE) that offer good practical
utility without any trusted server. By data analysis on real-life GPS
trajectory dataset, A. Monreale et al. [33] proposed an anonymity
technique to achieve the conflicting goals of data utility and data
privacy. Also, A. Monreale et al. [34] studied a differential privacy-
based privacy-preserving model to provide the formal data protection
safeguard. In order to achieve differential privacy data release, N.
Mohammed et al. [35] proposed a two-party algorithm for vertically
partitioned data as two parties according to the definition of secure
multiparty computation. After that, T. Zhu et al. [36] proposed a
correlated differential privacy solution to decrease most of noise
incurred via differential privacy in correlated dataset. In the aspect of
trusted recommendation, J. D. Zhang et al. [37] proposed a privacy-
preserving location recommendation framework (i.e. PLORE), which
utilized differential privacy mechanism to reach a good trade-off
between data utility and privacy-preserving. In addition, H. Shin et
al. [38] developed a matrix factorization algorithm based on local
differential privacy to achieve perturbed data publishing. In this
paper, we make use of both differential privacy model and trajectory
partitioning algorithm to discover latent trajectory communities under
strict privacy-preserving.
 
Fig. 2. The work flow of DP-LTOD.
3 OVERVIEW OF DP-LTOD SCHEME
In LTOD, users belong to the same community can share their
location-related information with each other. However, the privacy
may be revealed when users upload actual trajectory information to
LBSNs server.
In Fig. 2, we illustrate the architecture and work flow of DP-
LTOD. In a nutshell, it can be divided into servers and mobile clients.
On the server side, historical location data will be analyzed firstly
to construct the location obfuscation matrix and trajectory sequence
function. On the mobile client side, users need to download the
location obfuscation matrix and trajectory sequence function from
server in advance. When users want to publish their actual trajectory
data, procedures C1 and C2 are necessary to generate obfuscated
trajectory sequence. Then, the mobile client uploads the generated
trajectory sequence to server, in order to experience the personalized
services from LBSNs. Finally, LBSNs server discovers the latent
trajectory community through trajectory clustering (i.e. procedure
S3).
Based on this design, DP-LTOD is able to classify different
users with different interest or preference into different communities.
Besides, by making use of differential privacy theory, DP-LTOD can
effectively protect user privacy while ensuring the data utility. The
detailed workflow of DP-LTOD is summarized as follows.
Step (S1): The historical location data which describes the differ-
ent distribution of geographical locations is taken as training set. In
this paper, every location in the training set owns its semantic infor-
mation, which has been completed by our previous studies [1], [4].
As we know, in order to ensure the data utility, one location should
be obfuscated to another location which have the similar semantic
information with a high probability. However, the original location
may be inferred by making use of the difference of probability.
Therefore, we add noise based on Laplace distribution to the numeric
outputs to tradeoff the privacy and data utility. According to this rule,
the differential privacy-guaranteed location obfuscation matrix can be
generated.
Step (S2): After that, the work flow moves to select an optimal
trajectory which has the shortest geographical distance with original
trajectory. Every trajectory can be divided into a number of segments
because it is generated by linking the visited locations of users in
accordance with time. Therefore, the geographical distance between
two trajectories can be converted to the sum of the distance between
each two segments. The shorter the distance between candidate
segment and original segment is, the higher the probability of being
chosen is. However, the next visited location may be inferred by
making use of the difference of probability. In order to tradeoff
the privacy and data utility, we add noise based on exponential
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differential privacy-guaranteed trajectory sequence function can be
generated.
Step (C1): When users want to publish their physical trajectory
data to LBSNs server, they should firstly download the location
obfuscation matrix. Then the actual location can be obfuscated to
a fake location according to the training algorithm.
Step (C2): In order to generate the obfuscated trajectory sequence,
the trajectory sequence function should be also downloaded from LB-
SNs server. According to the optimization algorithm, one obfuscated
trajectory can be selected corresponding to the original trajectory.
Step (S3): LBSNs server receives the obfuscated trajectory se-
quence of each user. According to semantical distance and geo-
graphical distance, the trajectories can be clustered into different
communities. Finally, the process of latent trajectory community
discovering is completed.
DP-LTOD builds a complete framework with many unique char-
acteristics. It is able to protect users’ privacy from leaking and
support high data utility. Although the published trajectories are
not true trajectories of users, the trajectory communities can be
discovered in a certain tolerance range. Besides, DP-LTOD takes the
semantic information into account to cluster trajectories, which can
well discover the users who have similar interest or preference.
To further explain these main features in DP-LTOD, we detailedly
describe the scheme designs and algorithms in the next two sections.
4 DP-LTOD SCHEME DESIGNS
In this section, we give a description of latent trajectory community
discovering, and formulate the optimization problem of trajectory
obfuscation, in order to select the optimal obfuscated trajectory
sequence for original trajectory sequence. For ease of the following
presentation, Table 1 lists the relevant notations and definitions.
4.1 Latent Trajectory Community Discovering
Different with traditional trajectory community discovering methods,
LTOD clusters the users whose trajectories have similar semantic
information and geographical information into a community. We
define 〈loni, lati〉 as the two-tuples of longitude and latitude for
location loci. Based on our previous works [1], [4], the semantic
information Ci corresponding to loci can be acquired.
Location Obfuscation Matrix. Let Pr [loci, locj ] denote the
transition probability from location loci to location locj . If loci
and locj have the same type information, namely Ci = Cj , they
will be obfuscated each other with a higher probability. However,
one location loci can not be obfuscated to itself. Thus, location
obfuscation matrix M can be trained according to the relationship
between location and type in historical location datasets.
Movement Pattern. Let loc1 → loc2 → · · · → locn denote the
location sequence of user k linked by chronological order in one day.
The corresponding type sequence is represented as C1 → C2 → · ·
· → Cn. Movement pattern can well reflect the interest or preference
of users in a certain period. It means a series of activities that users
usually do. Thus, the movement pattern of one user is acquired by
extracting the frequent subsequences from his type sequences.
In this paper, we take semantical distance and geographical
distance into account to cluster the users with similar interest or
preference. The semantical distance between two users is short when
they have similar movement pattern. Geographical distance means the
distance between movement trajectories of two users, and the detailed










i Obfuscated location, segment, trajectory
Ci Type information of location loci
R, L Set of actual locations, segments
R′, L′ Set of obfuscated locations, segments
D Query dimension of function
R Real space of mapping
O Output domain of function
∆f , ∆u Global sensitivity of function
u Score function
Pr [loci, locj ] Probability of loci obfuscated to locj
π (loci) Priori probability distribution of loci
σ (loci) Posterior probability distribution of loci







Distance between Lij and L∗ij
SD (Ti, Tj) Semantic distance between Ti and Tj
GD (Ti, Tj) Geographical distance between Ti and Tj
LD (Ti, Tj) Latent distance between Ti and Tj
4.2 Trajectory Obfuscation
Trajectory obfuscation is to find one trajectory which is similar with
the original trajectory. In order to well describe the geographical
distance between two trajectories, the first step is to divide the
trajectories into several segments. Han et al. [18] have made a
quantitatively analysis on the information loss of different partition
methods. In this paper, we suppose the trajectories can be divided
according to access time of each location. So the original trajectory
consists of k segments Lij is defined as T , and the obfuscated
trajectory corresponding to T is defined as T ∗ which consists of
k obfuscated segments L∗ij . As shown in Fig. 3, loci denotes the
true location of one user, and loc∗i denotes the obfuscated location
corresponding to loci. Let
−→
Lij denote a vector constructed by points
loci and locj . Likewise,
−→




Perpendicular Distance between true segmentLi and obfuscated













where d⊥1 and d⊥2 are the distance from points loci and locj to
segment L∗ij , respectively.
Parallel Distance between true segment Lij and obfuscated












where d‖1 is the minimum of the Euclidean distance from point loc′i
to point loc∗i and point loc
∗
j , d‖2 is the minimum of the Euclidean
distance from point loc′j to point loc
∗
i and point loc
∗
j .
Angle Distance between true segment Lij and obfuscated seg-









∥∥∥−→Lij∥∥∥× sin (θi) , if θ ∈ [0, π
2
]







∥∥∥−→Lij∥∥∥ is the length of segment Lij , θi is the angle between
true segment Lij and obfuscated segment L∗ij . In this paper, we
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Fig. 3. Geographical distance function between two segments.
Thus, the distance between true segment Lij and obfuscated



























where ω⊥, ω‖ and ωθ are the weight of perpendicular distance,
parallel distance and angle distance, respectively. In practice, the
value of ω⊥, ω‖ and ωθ should be determined according to different
applications.
In order to mine the obfuscated trajectory sequence which is
similar to the original trajectory sequence in geographical space
and semantical space. The weights of semantical similarity and
geographical similarity can be computed as:







where Pr [loci, loc∗i ] denotes the probability of location loci obfus-
cated to location loc∗i . It can be acquired by the type information of
each location (i.e. P [type (loci) , type (loc∗i )]).
We define the sets of location loci and segment Lij areR and L,
respectively. The corresponding sets of obfuscated location loc∗i and
segment L∗ij areR∗ and L∗, respectively. And there are two decision
variables to be used for the following problem formulation.
Xi =
{




























Yij = Xj , j ∈ V,
Xi, Yij ∈ {0, 1} , i ∈ R, j ∈ V.
(8)
The objective function minimizes the total difference between
obfuscated trajectory sequence and original trajectory sequence while
the first condition is the constraint for sequence continuity. The
second condition is to restrict the value of Xi and Yij . And V
means one set which element i is not included in the set R, namely,
V = R− {i}.
The above problem can be essentially treated as a node-weighted
steiner tree problem [39], which is proved to be NP-hard. So our
basic problem is also NP-hard, which can be solved by a heuristic
algorithm. In Section 5, we will explain the heuristic trajectory
obfuscation algorithm in detail.
5 DP-LTOD ALGORITHMS
In this section, we first give the definition of trajectory sequence and
databases. Then, we construct the privacy model and adversary mod-
el. Corresponding to adversary models, we explain two differential
privacy-based algorithms in DP-LTOD including location obfusca-
tion matrix generation and trajectory sequence function generation.
Finally, we state the trajectory clustering algorithm in DP-LTOD to
discover latent trajectory communities.
5.1 Trajectory Sequences and Databases
In this paper, a trajectory sequence is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (Trajectory Sequence). A trajectory sequence is
consisted of the locations according to time series and distance:
T = loc1
L12−−→ loc2
L23−−→ · · ·
L(|T |−1)|T |−−−−−−−→ loc|T |, where |T | is
the length of this trajectory and ∀i (1 ≤ i ≤ |T |), loci ∈ RT is
a discrete location, which is denoted by the latitude and longitude.
L(i−1)i ∈ LT is a segment linked by two locations.
Each trajectory sequence represents the mobile behavior of us-
er. Let RT denote the set of locations in T , namely, RT ={
loc1, loc2, . . . , loc|T |
}
, and LT represents the set of segments in T ,
namely, LT =
{
L1, L2, . . . , L|T |−1
}
. The corresponding sets of lo-



















For an original trajectory sequence, there are many candidate
locations and segments to be selected, in order to generate the
obfuscated trajectory sequence. LetDloc∗i denote the database of can-
didate locations, namely, Dloc∗i = {S : S (loc) ∈ R
∗}. DL∗ij is the
database of candidate segments, namely, DL∗ij = {S : S (L) ∈ L
∗}.
The adjacent databases corresponding to Dloc∗i and DL∗ij are D
′
loc∗i
and D′L∗ij , respectively.
5.2 Privacy Model
Differential privacy [40] is a theoretical framework of privacy-
preserving, which provides strict and theoretical guarantees for the
probability distribution of outputs. It not only protects the privacy
of published databases against attackers with any priori knowledge,
but also requires the outputs of algorithms to be approximately same
even if any individuals record in the database is arbitrarily changed.
Taking the database of candidate locations for example, the definition
of differential privacy is described as follows.
Definition 2. (ε-Differential Privacy). Any two databases Dloc∗i
and D′loc∗i whose difference between them is at most one record
(i.e.,
∣∣∣Dloc∗i ∆D′loc∗i ∣∣∣ ≤ 1). A randomized algorithm F satisfies ε-






































represents the risk of
privacy leakage, which is controlled by the randomness of algorithm
F . ε represents the degree of privacy-preserving, and it is proved
that the smaller the value of ε is, the higher the degree of privacy-
preserving is. Usually, its value is as small as 1 or even smaller.
Uncorrected Pro
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Definition 3. (Global Sensitivity ). For a given function f : D →







∥∥∥f (Dloc∗i )− f (D′loc∗i )∥∥∥1, (10)
for any two databases Dloc∗i and D
′
loc∗i
which differ in at most one
record. D and R represent the query dimension of function f and real
space of mapping, respectively.
According to the above definitions, it can be seen that algorithm
F satisfies ε-differential privacy from a theoretical point of view.
A standard approach for guaranteeing differential privacy is to add
random noise to the real output of algorithm F based on the
databases. Laplace mechanism and exponential mechanism are two
common methods for adding noise. And the noise level is related to
the global sensitivity, i.e., the maximal change in the outputs of a
function when any individual record is changed.
Composition Properties. Generally speaking, the differential
privacy algorithm may be utilized repeatedly to address one complex
privacy-preserving problem. In order to control the whole privacy-
preserving level in the given ε range, it is necessary to reasonably
allocate ε to each steps of the differential privacy algorithm. Sequen-
tial composition and parallel composition are two critical composition
properties in differential privacy.
Theorem 1. (Sequential Composition). Suppose k algorithms
F1,F2...,Fk whose privacy-preserving level is ε1, ε2..., εk, re-
spectively. For the same database Dloc∗i , it can provide
∑k
i=1 εi-

















In order to evaluate the privacy risk of DP-LTOD, we construct
two adversary models by considering location attacks and trajectory
attacks, respectively. Suppose attackers have any priori knowledge
except actual locations of victims.
1) Location Attacks. The adversary is assumed to know some
priori knowledge about the probability distribution of a victim’s
actual location loci, represented as π (loci). In addition, the location
obfuscation matrix can be acquired by downloading from the server
directly.
According to Bayes’ rule [41], the posterior probability distribu-




i ] · π (loci)∑
locj∈R Pr [locj , loc
∗
i ] · π (locj)
, (11)
where locj denotes any one location in set R except loci and loc∗i ,
σ (loci) denotes the posterior probability of locj .
Under this adversary model, location privacy-preserving in the
process of location obfuscation matrix generation is to limit the
improvement of attackers’ posterior knowledge over the prior knowl-
edge, i.e., σ (loci) /π (loci). Intuitively, if two locations loci and
locj have similar probabilities of being obfuscated to location loc∗i ,
then an attacker will be unable to distinguish whether the actual
location is loci or locj .
2) Trajectory Attacks. The adversary makes the assumption
that trajectory sequence of each user can be modeled as a Markov
Chain (MC) in region R. Then the mobile status Muk of user k is
a transition matrix for the user’s MC. The entry Mukij , i, j = 1, ..., n
of Muk denotes the probability that user k will move from location
loci to location locj in the next time slot.
Algorithm 1 Differential Privacy Location Obfuscation Matrix
Input: A set of locations R, type transition probability matrix P
// The number of locations is N
Output: N ×N differential privacy location obfuscation matrix M
1: Define type (loci) is the type of each location loci, H (i, j) is the
probability from loci to locj
2: Initialize M→
 H (1, 1) · · · H (1, N)... . . . ...
H (N, 1) · · · H (N,N)

3: For i→ 1, 2, . . . , N do
4: For j → 1, 2, . . . , N do
5: If i == j then
6: H (i, j) ← 0; // The same two locations can’t be obfuscated
each other
7: Else










12: Normalize the value of M;
13: Return M
According to Markov’s rule [42], the objective of attackers is to
construct the transition matrix Muk based on any priori movement
information of user k.
Under this adversary model, trajectory privacy-preserving in the
process of trajectory sequence function generation is to prevent the
attackers from inferring actual segment Lij by making use of the
obfuscated segment L∗ij of victims.
5.4 Location Obfuscation Matrix Generation
The objective of location obfuscation matrix is to encode the transi-
tion probabilities of obfuscating any one location to another location.
In this paper, it protects user location privacy by selecting suitable
transition probabilities, which can make it impossible to accurately
infer the true location from its obfuscated location, even if adversaries
have stolen the location obfuscation matrix. Due to the outputs of
location obfuscation matrix are numeric, noise based on Laplace
distribution can be added to the outputs, in order to make the
generated location obfuscation matrix satisfies ε-differential privacy.
Laplace Mechanism. This mechanism can achieve ε-differential
privacy by adding random noise which follows Laplace distribution
into the true outputs.
Theorem 2. [43] Any one function f : D → Rd, whose global










+ < Lap1 (0, λ) , ..., Lapd (0, λ) > .
(12)
Meanwhile, the probability dense function of Laplace distribution is




. And λ can be computed by
the global sensitivity ∆f and the differential privacy parameter ε,
namely λ = ∆fε .
For defending against location attacks, Algorithm 1 shows the
pseudo-code of location obfuscation matrix generation. The main
idea of this algorithm is to add noise based on Laplace distribution
to the support of all possible candidate locations and select optimal
locations to be obfuscated according to their noisy supports. In
particular, we select the candidate locations according to the order
of the original trajectory sequence. Suppose the original trajectory
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the location obfuscation matrix, the probability any one location
loci obfuscated to another location loc∗i is computed. In this paper,
latent trajectory communities could be mined by considering the
type information of locations. Therefore, we think the calculation of
P [type (loci) , type (locj)] accesses to sensitive actual information.
It is the main privacy requirement but not the only one. For conve-
nience, we define the probability H (i, j) is 1 when loci and loc∗i
belong to the same type. If loci and loc∗i belong to different type, the
probability H (i, j) is 0. Because the optimal location selection is an
inquiry function, the global sensitivity of this algorithm is computed
as 1 (i.e. ∆f = 1). First, the location obfuscation matrix M are
initialized by adding the value of each element H (i, j). Then, we
compute the noisy support of each element in M according to the
global sensitivity ∆f . Finally, the location obfuscation matrix M
can be generated when noisy support of each element exceed the
threshold εl.
Lemma 1. The optimal location selection technique satisfies εl-
differential privacy.
Proof. Let Qi denote the support computations of obfuscated
location loc∗i in initial matrix M. Corresponding to each location in
original trajectory sequence, the obfuscated location can be selected




database forDloc∗i , which means that they are different in at most one
record. The amount of noise added to the support of each element is
determined by the allocated privacy budget εl and global sensitivity
∆f . Moreover, due to adding (or removing) a candidate location can,
in the worst case, affect the support of obfuscated location selection
by 1. The global sensitivity of Qi is 1, namely ∆f = 1. Thus,




should be added to Qi to satisfy εl-
differential privacy. The detailed derivation process can be seen in
Appendix A.
5.5 Trajectory Sequence Function Generation
The objective of trajectory sequence function is to link the selected
locations to generate the obfuscated trajectory sequence. In this paper,
it not only guarantees user trajectory privacy, but also achieves
good data utility by making use of heuristic trajectory obfuscation
algorithm. Due to the outputs of trajectory sequence function are
non-numeric, noise based on exponential distribution can be added
to the outputs, in order to make the generated trajectory sequence
function satisfies ε-differential privacy.
Exponential Mechanism. Laplace mechanism can be adapted to
the numeric search results. However, there are many search results
may be non-numeric in practice, which cause the outputs can’t be
affected by adding noises. In that case, exponential mechanism had
been proposed by McSherry et al. [44] to make the algorithms satisfy
ε-differential privacy.
Theorem 3. [44] A given score function u : D × O → R, whose










Thereinto, r represents the selected items from output domainO. And
the higher the score is, the bigger the probability it may be selected
is.
For defending against trajectory attacks, we utilize exponential
mechanism to probabilistically select the segments in database L∗ at
every time slot. As we mentioned earlier, there are k − 1 segments
which should be selected to constitute the obfuscated trajectory
Algorithm 2 Differential Privacy Trajectory Sequence Function
Input: Original trajectory sequence T , differential privacy location
obfuscation matrix M
Output: Obfuscated trajectory sequence T ∗
1: Define n is the length of trajectory T , loci is the location in T , Lij
is the segment in T , loc∗i is the location in T
∗, L∗ij is the segment






is the distance between Lij and L∗ij








3: For all loci in T do
4: Select the candidate location loc∗i from M;
5: End for
6: For i→ 1, 2, . . . , n do

























Add exponential noise into the output




13: Return T ∗
sequence corresponding to original trajectory sequence. We define
a score function u : L∗ × DL∗ij → R that assigns a score value for
each candidate segment L∗ij ∈ DL∗ij . According to Eq. (5), the score












As the change of one record in DL∗ij , the global sensitivity of this










The score function makes the proposed algorithm prefer to select
the obfuscated segment which is closest to the original segment
in geographical space. By considering the utility of all candidate
segments, the noise based on exponential distribution is added to the
output to select one segment S (L) ∈ DL∗ij following the probability
as:






















Lemma 2. The optimal segment selection technique satisfies εs-
differential privacy.
Proof. Let Qi denote the support computations of selected seg-
ment L∗ij in candidate set DL∗ij . Corresponding to each segment in
original trajectory sequence, the obfuscated segment can be selected




database for DL∗ij , which means that they are different in at most one
record. The amount of noise added to the support of each element is
determined by the allocated privacy budget εs and global sensitivity
∆f . Thus, the exponential noise should be added to Qi to satisfy
εs-differential privacy. The detailed derivation process can be seen in
Appendix B.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code of privacy trajectory se-
quence function generation. The main idea of this algorithm is to add
noise based on exponential distribution to the support of all possible
candidate segments and select which segments to be obfuscated ac-
cording to their noisy supports. In particular, we select the candidate
U
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Fig. 4. The process of trajectory clustering for LTOD.
segments according to the order of original trajectory sequence. In
order to generate the trajectory sequence function, the first step is to
compute the score while any one segment Lij obfuscated to another
segment L∗ij . In this paper, the score is computed by considering the
geographical distance between segment Lij and segment L∗ij . Then,
we compute the noisy support of each segment in set DL∗ij according
to the global sensitivity ∆f . Finally, the trajectory sequence function
can be generated when noisy support of each segment exceed the
threshold.
Lemma 3. The trajectory sequence function generation algorithm
(i.e., Algorithm 2) satisfies ε-differential privacy, where ε = kεl +
(k − 1) εs.
Proof. Suppose the original trajectory consists of k locations, and
then it can be divided into k−1 segments. The objective of Algorithm
2 is to generate the obfuscated trajectory which also consists of k
locations and k − 1 segments. The process of trajectory obfuscation
can be considered as computing the sum of Q = 〈Q1, ..., Qk〉 and
S = 〈S1, ..., Sk−1〉. Based on the sequential composition property
of differential privacy (i.e. Theorem 1), this algorithm satisfies ε-
differential privacy, where ε = kεl + (k − 1) εs.
5.6 Trajectory Clustering
In our data model, one trajectory consists of a sequence of segments.
We take both semantical distance and geographical distance into
account to compute the latent distance between two trajectories.
The semantical distance between T ∗i and T
∗
j can be computed as:
SD
(





∣∣∣T ∗i ⋂T ∗j ∣∣∣
|T ∗i |+
∣∣∣T ∗j ∣∣∣ , (17)
where |T ∗| is the number of segments contained in trajectory T ∗ and∣∣∣T ∗i ⋂T ∗j ∣∣∣ is the number of matching segments in trajectory T ∗i and
trajectory T ∗j . The two trajectories are more similar if they contain
more common sub-sequence in semantical space [1].
The geographical distance between T ∗i and T
∗




























Based on semantical distance and geographical distance, the latent
distance between T ∗i and T
∗
j can be computed as:
LD
(

















where α1 and α2 denote the weight of geographical distance and
semantical distance, respectively.
Algorithm 3 Latent Trajectory Community Discovering (LTOD)
Input: A set of trajectories T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}
Output: A set of communities O = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck}
1: Define SD is semantic distance, GD is geographical distance, LD
is latent distance, len is the length of each trajectory, l is the number
of common sub-sequence in semantic distance
2: Initialize count = 0
3: For i→ 1, 2, . . . , n do
4: For j → 1, 2, . . . , (n− 1) do
5: m← min [len (Ti) , len (Tj)];
/* Computing SD */
6: For t→ 1, 2, . . . , (m− l) do
7: Compute the number of common sub-sequence count;
8: End for
9: SD ← count
len(Ti)+len(Tj)
;
/* Computing GD */
10: For s→ 1, 2, . . . , (m− 1) do

















/* Computing LD */
14: LD ← (α1GD − α2SD);
/* Trajectory clustering */
15: If i == 1 then
16: C1 ← T1;
17: Else if miniLD (Ti, Ck) ≤ θt then
18: Put Ti into Ck;
19: Else if miniLD (Ti, Ck) > θt then





To partition the users with different trajectories into k commu-
nities based on the latent distance, we present a trajectory clustering
method to discover the users who have similar movement pattern and
preference. As shown in Fig. 4, we first divide the trajectories into
different segments according to the locations. Then, the correspond-
ing semantical distance and geographical distance among trajectories
can be computed by Eq. (17) and Eq. (18), respectively. Finally, the
latent trajectory communities are discovered by computing weighted
combinations of SD and GD.
Algorithm 3 shows the pseudo-code of LTOD. In the phase of
trajectory clustering, we firstly select one trajectory T1 and put it into
one community C1. For the second trajectory T2, we compute the
latent distance between T1 and T2. If the distance is no more than the
threshold θt, the trajectory T2 is put into C1. If the distance is more
than the threshold θt, we create another community C2 and put T2
into C2. For the n-th trajectory Tn, we compute the latent distance
between Tn and each trajectory in each community. Through the
above iterative process, the n trajectories can be classified into k
clusters.
Thus, our DP-LTOD scheme not only discovers the k latent
trajectory communities based on the movement pattern of users, but
also protects the users’ privacy from leaking.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct several experiments from two real-world
datasets, in order to evaluate the performance of our DP-LTOD
scheme in the aspects of trajectory community detection, effect of
privacy budget and effect of key techniques.
6.1 Datasets and Experimental Setup
Datasets. We use two datasets to verify the validity and efficiency of
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TABLE 2
20 types of raw POI datasets
Type Name Type Name
1 Food & Beverages Service 11 Motorcycle Service
2 Road Ancillary Facilities 12 Car Service
3 Place Address Information 13 Car Maintenance
4 Scenic Spot 14 Car Sales
5 Public Facilities 15 Commercial Housing
6 Company 16 Life Service
7 Shopping Service 17 Sports Leisure Service
8 Transportation Service 18 Health Care Service
9 Financial Insurance Service 19 Governments Organizations
10 Education Culture Service 20 Accommodation Service
of 182 users with 18670 trajectories in five years (from 2008/10
to 2012/8), which not only includes the daily activity (e.g. going
home, working, etc.), but also includes the recreational activity (e.g.
shopping, traveling, eating, sports, etc.). Most of the data in GeoLife
datasets lies in Beijing and few of them in Europe or USA. Beijing
POI datasets [4] includes the location information for all kinds of
interest points in Beijing. As shown in Table 2, the raw Beijing POI
datasets can be classified into 20 types to well describe the semantic
information of trajectories.
Experimental Setup. All experiments are conducted on a com-
puter with Intel i7-3770 3.40 GHz CPU and 8 GB RAM, running 64-
bit Windows 10 OS. Because the experiment only considers the GPS
trajectory information locating in the region of Beijing, we filter the
latitude and longitude in the region of [39.4, 41.1] and [115.4, 117.6],
respectively. The total number of sampling points is 20284273 after
pre-processing, which include longitude, latitude and time. According
to our previous studies [1], [4], different locations have been assigned
different semantic information, and different users may have different
movement pattern or preference. Fig. 5 shows an example of semantic
description of locations for one user. In order to facilitate the further
experiments, we pre-process the trajectories to make them have the
same number of segments, i.e. |T ∗i | =
∣∣∣T ∗j ∣∣∣.
6.2 Trajectory Community Detection
To evaluate the effect of trajectory community detection, we compare
our LTOD method with buddy-based discovering algorithm (BU) [46]
and SP-tree [20]. BU algorithm is used to discover the traveling
companions for users according to their uploaded streaming trajec-
tories. SP-tree is used to discover the movement-based communities
of users, where users in the same community have similar movement
behaviors.
Evaluation Metrics. We use precision, recall and F1-score to e-
valuate the effectiveness while utilizing different algorithms to detect
trajectory communities. Since there is no unique method to cluster
the users of Geolife datasets into different kinds of communities, we
select the test set of mined communities based on user similarity
which has been computed by our previous works [1], [4]. This
experiment is to compare the performance of trajectory community
detection for LTOD, BU and SP-tree.
The definition of each evaluation metric is explained as follows.
• Precision: Let A denote the set of detected communities, and
B represents the set of communities in test set. The precision






where k is the number of discovered communities.
longitude


















Fig. 5. The semantic description of locations for one user.
• Recall: Let B′ denote the set of positive communities in
training set. The recall of trajectory community detection






∣∣∣B′ ∣∣∣ is the number of positive communities.
• F1-score: In order to synthetically evaluate the stability of
trajectory community detection methods, the metric of F1-
score can be computed as:




According to the evaluation metrics, we compare our DP-LTOD
method with BU and SP-tree in the aspects of effect of percentages of
training data, effect of number of discovered communities and effect
of number of positive communities as follows.
(1) Effect of percentages of training data:
We first compare the performance of these algorithms according
to different percentages of training data. Data sparsity is always
happened due to user privacy. Especially in LBSNs, users may upload
their true locations or trajectories to server in order to have a good
quality of experience. However, some sensitive locations should be
inhibited to protect users’ privacy from leaking. In that case, it is
important to efficiently detect the community which includes the
users with similar interest or preference for service recommendation.
From Figs. 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c), we can see DP-LTOD substantially
outperforms BU and SP-tree. For algorithm BU, it uses the density-
based clustering, including size, distance, duration and density, to
discover traveling companion. However, if the uploaded trajectory
datasets is sparse (e.g. inhibited sensitive information publishing),
the BU can not effectively discover qualified companions for target
user, which inevitably leads to poor performance. For algorithm
SP-tree, it utilizes the sequential probability tree to construct user
model and mine the movement-based trajectory communities of users.
However, only the geographical location sequences are considered in
the structure of user model. Thus, algorithm SP-tree does not produce
good results when the trajectory data is incomplete and sparse. In
contrast, in DP-LTOD, we not only consider the geographical distance
among location sequences, but also consider the semantic information
of each location. Through mining the movement pattern of each user,
we can classify the users who have different interest or preference
into different kinds of communities. Since the semantic information
is considered instead of actual location information, our DP-LTOD
algorithm can well address the issue of data sparsity.
From Fig. 6, we can also see DP-LTOD obtains bet-
ter performance than BU and SP-tree in terms of Precision.
The reasons are explained as follows. Semantic information
can well reflect the interest or preference of users. For ex-
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Fig. 6. Effect of percentages of training data
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Fig. 7. Effect of number of discovered communities
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Fig. 8. Effect of number of positive communities
er B is “type1 → type10 → type15”, they will have the
same movement pattern as “Food & Beverages Service →
Education Culture Service → Commercial Housing” ac-
cording to Table II. Although the actual location sequences of user A
and user B are different, they may be the latent friends which have
similar interest or preference in semantic space. Thus, user A and user
B can be clustered into one community, which effectively increase the
precision of trajectory community discovering.
(2) Effect of number of discovered communities:
Second, we compare the performance of the three algorithms
according to different number of discovered communities, which
reflects the different granularity of trajectory community detection.
Coarser-grained business task can well discover the users who have
similar mobile behavior (e.g. direction, distance and velocity, etc.).
However, fine-grained business task can further mine the similar users
who have specific interest or preference (e.g. movement pattern and
habit, etc.). In LBSNs, it is important to find the potential friends
who have similar interest or preference by fine-grained trajectory
clustering [47]. From Figs. 7(a), 7(b) and 7(c), we can see DP-LTOD
achieves better performance than the other two algorithms although
the precision decreases as the number of discovered communities
increases. This is because, our algorithm DP-LTOD aims to mine the
interest or preference of users in semantic space, it is well adapted
to the fine-grained business task. From the experimental results, we
can also see algorithm SP-tree gains comparable performance to DP-
LTOD. The reason is that algorithm SP-tree makes use of sequential
probability tree to construct user model. Sequential probability tree
can discover much frequency information which reflects the activity
law of users in geographical space, and thus algorithm SP-tree can
achieve better performance than Bu.
(3) Effect of number of positive communities:
Finally, we compare the performance of the three algorithms
according to different number of positive communities. In this exper-
iment, we define positive community as the communities that have
existed in the training set. That is to say, we have known some
similar users who are clustered into different communities before
conducting trajectory community detection. Under such condition,
from Figs. 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c), we can see the precision increases
as the number of positive communities increases. However, the
recall of each algorithm is decreasing. This is because more positive
communities training set includes, higher false negatives server has,
i.e. Eq. (21). We can also see algorithm DP-LTOD has the best
performance of precision in three algorithms. As discussed above,
algorithm DP-LTOD takes semantic information of each location into
Uncorr ct d Pro
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Fig. 9. Effect of privacy budget
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Fig. 10. Effect of key techniques
account to effectively mine interest or preference of users, and further
cluster them into different communities. Since more information is
considered than the other two algorithms which only consider geo-
graphical information of locations for trajectory clustering, algorithm
DP-LTOD can achieves better precision. What’s more, from Fig. 8(c),
we can see the changing of F1-score is very small for algorithm DP-
LTOD. It reflects that the performance of algorithm DP-LTOD is
more stable in spite of the number of positive communities.
From the above experiments, we can see the latent trajectory com-
munities, which have similar user preference, could be well mined by
considering geographical information and semantical information of
locations. Thus, LBSNs server can provide personalized community
discovering services by making use of DP-LTOD algorithm. Next,
we will evaluate the effectiveness of privacy budget for different
differential privacy trajectory sequence publishing algorithms.
6.3 Effect of Privacy Budget
The aim of this part is to evaluate the data utility of three algo-
rithms when original trajectory sequence is translated to obfuscated
trajectory sequence. Privacy budget ε can well reflect the strength of
privacy-preserving. As ε increases, the strength of privacy-preserving
will be reduced. Normally, the value of ε is not more than 1. Thus,
we evaluate the performance with ε varies from 0.2 to 1 [48]. Each
algorithm is run 20 times and the average is reported. In this part,
we utilize proposed trajectory community detection algorithm (i.e.
LTOD) to evaluate the data utility of obfuscated trajectory sequences.
Furthermore, in order to better complete this experiment, we declare
that there is almost no obfuscation mechanisms when the value of ε
is 1.
As DP-LTOD is the first method that supports the latent trajectory
community discovering under differential privacy, we compare the al-
gorithm DP-LTOD with two differential privacy trajectory publishing
algorithms, i.e. N -gram [49] and Noisy Prefix Tree (NPT) [50]. In
this experiment, the inputs of three algorithms are both the same
original trajectory. The number of locations which original trajectory
owns is k. The value of k is set as 50. In addition, the values of εl
and εs are same in default. Algorithm N -gram is able to generate the
anonymized trajectories by making use of variable length N -grams,
and algorithm NPT can utilize a prefix tree with noise to obfuscate
the trajectories. For N -gram and NPT algorithms, we first conduct
them on the original trajectories to generate obfuscated trajectories,
and then run the non-private LTOD algorithm (i.e. Algorithm 3) by
using the obfuscated trajectories.
There are three reasons to explain that why we choose N-gram
and NPT algorithms as comparison. 1) Our DP-LTOD scheme is
also to protect user privacy before users publish their trajectory
sequences to LBSNs server. All three methods are designed to protect
trajectory information of users from leakage. 2) All three methods
utilize differential privacy theory to obfuscate original trajectory
sequence, which can not only protect user privacy, but also provide
good data utility. What’s more, our DP-LTOD method divides original
trajectory sequence into a series of locations and segments, and
generates obfuscated trajectory sequence by linking the obfuscated
locations. 3) This paper not only considers user privacy-preserving,
but also considers latent trajectory community discovering. In the
aspect of latent trajectory community discovering, DP-LTOD method
can cluster the users who have similar interest or preference into a
community. Therefore, in the aspect of user privacy-preserving, we
compare DP-LTOD method with N-gram and NPT algorithms, and
evaluate the performance under different privacy budget ε.
According to the evaluation scheme from X. Xiao et al. [51], we
utilize relative error (RE) to evaluate the utility of a counting query Q
over the sets of obfuscated trajectories T̃ and original trajectories T .
And the relative error with respect to the accuracy of three methods
can be computed as:
RE =
∣∣∣Q(T̃ )−Q (T )∣∣∣
max {Q (T ) , s}
, (23)
where s is a sanity bound to effectively mitigates the influence of the
queries with negligibly small selectivities.
Fig. 9 shows the performance of DP-LTOD, N -gram and NPT
under different privacy budget ε. From the experimental results, we
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find three algorithms behave in a similar way, i.e. the performance of
different metrics is improved while ε increases. The reason is that as
the increasing of ε, a lower degree of privacy-preserving is provided
and a smaller magnitude of noise is added. We can also see algorithm
DP-LTOD constantly achieves better performance with the same level
of privacy-preserving. This is because, algorithm DP-LTOD makes
use of two steps to add noise. Firstly, Laplace distribution-based
noise is added at the stage of optimal location selection, which not
only prevents the loss of semantic information, but also ensures εl-
differential privacy. Secondly, exponential distribution-based noise
is added at the stage of optimal segment selection, which not only
prevents the loss of geographical information, but also ensures εs-
differential privacy. Algorithm N -gram first utilizes a variable-length
n-gram model to extract the sensitive information of a trajectory
sequence, and then add adaptive noise to the sequential data. Al-
gorithm NPT first constructs the prefix tree for original trajectory
sequence, then add noise to each node. As algorithm N -gram and
NPT fail to consider the semantic information of locations and
the geographical distance of segments, the obfuscated trajectory is
different with original trajectory in semantic space and geographical
space. However, for algorithm DP-LTOD, since obfuscated trajectory
is similar with original trajectory in semantic space and geograph-
ical space through the above two processes, the following step of
latent trajectory community discovering on server can have a better
performance by clustering the obfuscated trajectories. Especially in
Fig. 9(d), we observe algorithm DP-LTOD can achieve lower average
relative error than the other two algorithms with privacy budget ε
increases.
6.4 Effect of Key Techniques
In Fig. 10, we show how the optimal location selection technique,
optimal segment selection technique and threshold α1, α2 affect
the performance of algorithm DP-LTOD. In order to compare the
performance of key techniques, we set the number of discovered
communities to be 8, and the privacy budget to be 0.6. Let LS
denote the algorithm which firstly utilizes the optimal location se-
lection technique to select the suitable location, and then randomly
chooses the segments to generate obfuscated trajectory. Let SS be the
algorithm that randomly selects the obfuscated locations, and then
uses the optimal segment selection technique to generate obfuscated
trajectory. From Figs. 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c), we can see DP-LTOD
achieves better performance than these algorithms with the value of
α2/α1 increases. We also observe that the precision of algorithm
DP-LTOD and LS increases as the value of α2/α1 increases but
the precision of algorithm SS decreases. This is because, algorithm
DP-LTOD and LS consider the semantic information of locations to
generate obfuscated trajectory sequences, which can well discover the
users who have similar movement pattern and preference. However,
algorithm SS only considers the geographical information of seg-
ments, which causes the performance decreases. What’s more, from
Fig. 10(c), we can see the F1-score for algorithm DP-LTOD is better
when the value of α2/α1 is set between 0.5 and 1. This result will be
helpful for our future study on similar users discovering in LBSNs.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we study the problem of latent trajectory community
discovering under the rigorous differential privacy model. First, we
introduce Latent Trajectory cOmmunity Discovering (LTOD) which
takes users’ interest or preference into account to trajectory clustering.
Then, we explore the possibility of designing a Differential Priva-
cy Latent Trajectory cOmmunity Discovering (DP-LTOD) scheme
which can ensure great performance of privacy and data utility. We
found, in DP-LTOD, the feature of obfuscated trajectory sequence is
important to improve the accuracy of LTOD. If we could effectively
select the optimal obfuscation trajectory, the utility and privacy
tradeoff can be significantly improved. To this end, we formulate a
trajectory obfuscation problem to select an optimal trajectory which
has the smallest difference with the original trajectory. We prove this
problem is NP-hard, and propose a heuristic trajectory obfuscation
algorithm to solve the problem. In our DP-LTOD scheme, another
core is to add the noise required by differential privacy during the
stage of trajectory obfuscation. In order to prevent Bayes’ attack
and Markov’s attack, we add Laplace distribution-based noise and
exponential distribution-based noise to the outputs during the stages
of location obfuscation matrix generation and trajectory sequence
function generation, respectively. Through formal privacy analysis,
we prove that DP-LTOD scheme satisfies ε-differentially private.
By experiments, it shows that our DP-LTOD scheme can privately
discover latent trajectory community with high accuracy.
For the future work, we will further complete attack model by
considering social connection graph or text of content, etc. Deep
learning technology will be utilized to train location obfuscation
matrix, in order to intelligently perceive users’ practical location
and select obfuscated location. In addition, we will consider more
dimensions (e.g. time or velocity, etc.) to discover latent trajectory
communities. It would be interesting to apply discovered latent
trajectory communities to recommend personalized service for users
in LBSNs.
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APPENDIX A
Let Dloc∗i , D
′
loc∗i
represent any two candidate databases. For any
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(24)
According to Eq. (9), we prove that the optimal location selection
technique satisfies εl-differential privacy.
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APPENDIX B




























Let DL∗ij , D
′
L∗ij
represent any two candidate segment databases,





























































































































According to Eq. (9), we prove that the optimal segment selection
technique satisfies εs-differential privacy.
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